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Abstract 
In order to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, many countries have set various kinds of 
policy targets and introduced policy instruments accordingly, such as carbon pricing and 
renewable electricity subsidies. As a consequence, potential interactions and, especially, conflicts 
between these co-existing instruments have become a significant concern. In this paper, a partial 
equilibrium model is constructed to explore the interaction between carbon pricing and renewable 
electricity subsidies. Based on this model, the following issues are explored: the conditions under 
which a single policy is optimal and the scenarios where a policy mix is necessary in the 
realisation of the outlined policy targets, and the means by which to coordinate different policy 
targets to reduce the negative effects of any potential conflicts, especially possible CO2 price 
collapses. The optimal portfolio of the two policy targets is obtained, and the method of 
coordinating them to stablize CO2 prices is delineated. Thereafter, an empirical study of China’s 
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case is conducted. The results show that with the policy targets set by the Chinese government for 
2020, renewable energy power subsidies may lead to a collapse of CO2 prices, and a tightening of 
the carbon emission budget is necessary to stablize the latter. 
Keywords：policy mix; policy interaction; policy coordination; renewable energy policy; carbon 
pricing 
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1 Introduction 
To mitigate the adverse impact of climate change, many countries have introduced a range of 
policies to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, such as energy efficiency policies, subsidies 
for electricity production from renewable energy sources (RES-E), carbon pricing policies and so 
on (Zuluaga and Dyner, 2007; Zhu et al., 2014). For example, the European Union (EU) has 
agreed on two ambitious objectives for 2030; namely, a 40% reduction of carbon emissions from 
1990 levels, and a bolstering of the market share held by renewable energy to 27% (Siitonen and 
Ahtila, 2010). Accordingly, the EU has implemented a variety of policy instruments, such as the 
EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) and the renewable energy subsidy policy, or the renewable 
portfolio standard (RPS). As the world’s largest producer of CO2 emissions, China has piloted 
emission trading scheme in seven provinces and cities, and a nationwide carbon market is planned 
to be implemented in 2017, with the aim of lowering the carbon emission intensity by 40-45% by 
2020 and, further, to realise a carbon emission peak by 2030. Meanwhile, the country has also 
introduced a feed-in tariff (FIT) policy for renewable energy-based electricity, which will promote 
renewable energy development and increase the share held by green electricity to 15% by 2020 
and 20% by 2030. With this in mind, it can be foreseen that carbon pricing and the FIT policy 
would coexist for a certain period.  
The potential effects of interaction between the coexisting policy instruments are of notable 
concern for the policymakers (Goulder, 2013; Levinson, 2010). More specifically, the 
implementation of a carbon emission trading scheme would increase the emission costs of fossil 
fuel-based power plants and improve the relative competitiveness of renewable energy-derived 
electricity. As a side effect, the implementation of a carbon emission trading scheme may promote 
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renewable energy development. In addition, the FIT policy for renewable energy could increase 
the electricity production from RES, promoting the substitution of fossil fuel-based electricity. In 
sum, the FIT policy for RES may promote carbon abatement. What we have outlined above is 
only one aspect of the interaction between different policy instruments, that is, the synergy effect; 
the other one is the possible conflict effect. Some previous studies have pointed out that too 
stringent a policy for supporting renewable energy may lower carbon prices by reducing the 
demand for carbon emission permits in the carbon market (Fankhauser et al., 2010; Fischer and 
Preonas, 2010; Greaker et al., 2008), which would undermine the effect of the emission trading 
scheme on emission abatement and, especially, on low carbon energy investment (Grubb and 
Neuhoff, 2006; Abadie and Chamorro, 2008; Blanco and Rodrigues, 2008; Nordhaus, 2011; Mo et 
al., 2012; Löfgren et al., 2013; Mo et al., 2016). For example, the carbon prices set out by the EU 
ETS are low for several reasons, including the generous allocation of allowances, the lavish use of 
credits from offsetting projects, the outbreak of the financial crisis and so on. Besides these factors, 
faster-than-expected growth in renewable energy as a result of the related supporting policy is also 
a critical reason (Mo and Zhu, 2014). Consequently, the FIT policy for RES may negatively affect 
the performance of the emission trading scheme. At that point, how to coordinate the different 
policy instruments to avoid the effects of possible conflict would become a challenging issue. 
There have been a handful of relevant qualitative studies on the interaction and coordination 
between the coexisting policy instruments. The coevality of ETS and RES deployment targets 
creates a classic case of interaction effects. Amundsen and Mortensen (2001) applied a static 
equilibrium model to investigate both long- and short-term interactions between the renewable 
energy certificates (RECs) market and ETS in the context of the Danish power sector. The model 
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considered price ceilings and floors of RECs, CO2 prices and electricity imports. The results 
showed that under the condition of autarchy, tightening CO2 emissions, together with a fixed share 
of renewable energy-based electricity, may lead to a reduction in green producers’ profits and the 
RECs’ price. However, an increasing share of renewable energy-derived electricity with a fixed 
carbon emission cap would lead to CO2 price reductions. Abrell and Weigt (2008) simulated the 
interaction between the 20% CO2 reduction target and the 20% renewable energy (RE) share target 
using a computable general equilibrium model of the German economy based on 2004 data, and 
found that achievement of the 20% RE share target made the CO2 reduction target superfluous and 
thereby reduced the CO2 price to zero. In addition to this theory, several simulation-based studies 
have also predicted that RES deployment may impose a strong downward pressure on CO2 prices. 
For example, simulations by Van den Bergh et al. (2013) suggested that RES deployment reduced 
CO2 prices by €46 in 2008 and more than €100 in 2010. Meanwhile, in the simulation by De 
Jonghe et al. (2009), the allowance price could even drop to zero, depending on the stringency of 
the targets (see also Unger and Ahlgren, 2005; Weigt et al., 2013). As mentioned above, many 
researchers argue that the interaction between the ETS and RES policies has a negative effect on 
CO2 prices by reducing the demand for carbon permits in the electricity sector.  
To address the possible effects of conflict between the coexisting policy instruments, especially 
the possible low CO2 price, some researchers have considered the attainment of coordination 
between them. These authors believe that the long-term carbon emission cap target needs to be 
reconsidered to avoid a weakening of CO2 prices (Gawel, 2014; Freitas, 2015; Fais, 2014). In fact, 
many countries have pondered reducing CO2 emission allowances to stablize said prices. For 
example, the EU will establish a Market Stability Reserve (MSR) in 2018, while the placing of 
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allowances within the reserve will come into operation from 1 January 2019. When CO2 prices are 
too low in the eyes of the ETS, the MSR will absorb excess carbon emission allowances to avoid a 
possible collapse of such prices. Additionally, within the EU’s framework for climate and energy 
targets by 2030, the CO2 emissions cap will need to be lowered by 2.2% per year from 2021, 
compared with the current 1.74%.  
Although there have been a few qualitative discussions on how one of the coexisting policy 
instruments affects the performance of the others, quantitative studies are scarce, and techniques 
for coordinating different policy targets and their corresponding instruments are little discussed. 
In this work, therefore, we explore the potential interaction and coordination between carbon 
pricing and renewable subsidies within the context of a renewable energy power policy. To 
conduct a quantative analysis and highlight the interaction effect explicitly, a partial equilibrium 
model of the electricity market was built, incorporating the decision optimisation behaviour of 
fossil fuel power producers, renewable energy power producers and power grid firms. Based on 
this model, the portfolios of the carbon emission cap and renewable energy targets, under which 
one single policy is optimal and a policy mix is necessary, were obtained. In addition, we were 
able to determine the manner of coordinating different policy targets in order to reduce potential 
conflict between the varying instruments and, especially, to avoid possible CO2 price collapses. 
These two points are the main contribution of our work. In addition, an empirical study of China’s 
case was conducted. The results show that with the policy targets set by the Chinese government 
for 2020, a renewable energy power subsidy may lead to a collapse of CO2 prices, and adjusting 
the carbon emission cap target is therefore necessary for stabilisation. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model; analytical 
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results are presented in Section 3; Section 4 undertakes an empirical study in China and Section 5 
offers discussions and a conclusion.  
2 Model 
Based on the characteristics of the Chinese electricity market, three representative participants 
were incorporated into our model: a power grid firm, a fossil fuel electricity producer and a 
renewable energy electricity producer. Their relationship was that the power grid firm purchased 
electricity from both types of producers at corresponding on-grid prices, and sold all of it to 
consumers at a consumer price. During this process, all participants pursued profit maximisation. 
The decision making of the three participants were as follows: 
(1) The representative fossil fuel electricity producer has the flexibility to comply with CO2 
emission regulations by reducing his own carbon emissions, cutting his own production or  
purchasing emission permits from the markets, with the objective of maximising his profit 𝜋𝐹, 
max
𝑄𝐹,𝐴𝐹
𝜋𝐹 = 𝑅𝑓(𝑄𝐹 , 𝑃𝑓) − 𝐶𝑓(𝑄𝐹) − 𝐶𝑒(𝐴𝐹) − 𝐶𝑐(𝜃, 𝑄𝐹 , 𝐴𝐹) 
= 𝑃𝑓𝑄𝐹 − 𝐶𝑓(𝑄𝐹) − 𝐶𝑒(𝐴𝐹) − 𝑃𝑐(𝜃𝑄𝐹 − 𝐴𝐹)               (1) 
where 𝑅𝑓(∙) is the revenue from fossil fuel electricity sales, in other words, the fossil fuel power 
generation, 𝑄𝐹 multiplied by the on-grid price 𝑃𝑓 for fossil fuel power. 𝐶𝑓(∙) is the electricity 
production cost function, which is strictly monotonic, increasing in 𝑄𝐹  and convex; more 
specifically, Cf
'(∙)>0, Cf
''(∙)>0.  Ce(∙) is the carbon abatement cost function, and is similarly 
monotonic, increasing in abatement mount FA and convex, Ce
'(∙)>0, Ce
''(∙)>0 (Lecuyer and 
Quirion, 2013). 𝐶𝑐(∙) is the cost of purchasing carbon emission permits through auction or from 
the carbon market, which is the CO2 price, 𝑃𝑐 multiplied by the gap between the carbon emission 
amounts 𝜃𝑄𝐹 and the abatement amount 𝐴𝐹, in which 𝜃 is the intensity of CO2 emissions by 
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the fossil fuel power producer. It should be noted that the carbon emission permits are allocated by 
auction method in this situation. 
(2) There are N kinds of renewable energy sources, and for each kind, the producer maximises its 
profit 𝜋𝑖𝑅, 
max
𝑄𝑖𝑅
𝜋𝑖𝑅 = 𝑅𝑖𝑟(𝑄𝑖𝑅 , 𝑃𝑟) − 𝐶𝑖𝑟(𝑄𝑖𝑅) 
= 𝑃𝑟𝑄𝑖𝑅 − 𝐶𝑖𝑟(𝑄𝑖𝑅), 𝑖 = 1,2,3 … , 𝑁             (2) 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑟(∙) is the revenue from electricity sales, which equals to the amount of electricity 
produced, 𝑄𝑖𝑅, multiplied by the on-grid price 𝑃𝑟 for renewable energy power. The cost function 
𝐶𝑖𝑟(∙) is assumed to be monotonic, increasing in the amount of electricity produced, and convex; 
and formally, it satisfies the following conditions: Cir
'(∙)>0, Cir
''(∙)>0. The electricity producer 
maximises its profit by optimising its production decision, 𝑄𝑖𝑅. Since the renewable energy power 
subsidy policy was introduced, the on-grid price for renewable energy power 𝑃𝑟 is higher than 
that of the fossil fuel power, i.e. 𝑃𝑟 ≥ 𝑃𝑓, and the subsidy for the renewable energy power is 
𝑆 = 𝑃𝑟 − 𝑃𝑓. 
(3) The power grid firm maximises its profit 𝜋𝐺: 
max
𝑄𝑖𝑅
𝜋𝐺 = 𝑅𝑔(𝑄𝑇, 𝑃) − 𝑅𝑓(𝑄𝐹 , 𝑃𝑓) − ∑ 𝑅𝑖𝑟(𝑄𝑖𝑅 , 𝑃𝑟)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
= 𝑃(𝑄𝑇)𝑄𝑇 − 𝑃𝑓𝑄𝐹 − ∑ 𝑃𝑟𝑄𝑖𝑅
𝑁
𝑖=1 , 𝑖 = 1,2,3 … , 𝑁          (3) 
where 𝑅𝑔(∙) is the revenue from electricity sales to the consumer, 𝑅𝑓(∙) and ∑ 𝑅𝑖𝑟(∙)
𝑁
𝑖=1  are 
electricity purchasing costs from the fossil fuel electricity producer and the renewable energy 
electricity producer, respectively. 𝑃(∙) is the consumer price of electricity and 𝑄𝑇 is the total 
electricity from both energy producers, which is also the total electricity demand, as shown in Eq. 
(4), 
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𝑄𝑇 = 𝑄𝐹 + 𝑄𝑅 = 𝑄𝐹 + ∑ 𝑄𝑖𝑅
𝑁
𝑖=1 , 𝑖 = 1,2,3 … , 𝑁              (4) 
There are two policy targets set by the government: the carbon abatement target or carbon 
emission cap, and the share of renewable energy electricity target, which constitute the main 
constraining conditions. To be specific, the carbon emission constraint is expressed as follows:   
𝜃𝑄𝐹 − 𝐴𝐹 + 𝐸𝑁 − 𝐴𝑁 = ?̅?                        (5) 
where 𝜃𝑄𝐹 and 𝐸𝑁 are the carbon emissions in the baseline scenario for the electricity and 
non-electricity sectors respectively, and similarly, 𝐴𝐹 and 𝐴𝑁 are carbon emission abatements for 
the same two sectors. Eq. (5) denotes that the net carbon emission from the electricity 
sector, 𝜃𝑄𝐹 − 𝐴𝐹 and that from the non-electricity sector, 𝐸𝑁 − 𝐴𝑁, should be equal to the carbon 
emission cap ?̅?. 
In Eq. (5), it is critical to determine the carbon emission abatement for the non-electricity 
sector, 𝐴𝑁. In this work, we used the carbon emission abatement cost curve 𝐶𝑛(𝐴𝑁) for this 
purpose. More specifically, the marginal abatement cost of the non-electricity sector should be 
equal to the CO2 price under the carbon market equilibrium condition:  
𝐶𝑛
′(𝐴𝑁) = 𝑃𝑐.                               (6) 
The constraint condition for the renewable energy target is as follows:   
𝑄𝑅 = 𝛼𝑄𝑇                                (7) 
where 𝛼 is the share of the renewable electricity.  
Finally, the electricity demand function 𝑃(∙) is defined as follows, based on Lecuyer and 
Quirion (2013):  
𝑃(𝑄𝑇) = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄𝑇.                             (8) 
To conduct further analysis, we are required to make certain assumptions about the form of 
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the production and carbon abatement cost functions. To be precise, the marginal costs are 
assumed to have a classical linear-quadratic form, as per Jensen and Skytte (2002) and Lecuyer 
and Quirion (2013): 
𝐶𝑓(𝑄𝐹) =
1
2
𝑐1
𝑓𝑄𝐹
2 + 𝑐2
𝑓𝑄𝐹 ,                        (9) 
𝐶𝑟(𝑄𝑖𝑅) =
1
2
𝑐𝑖1
𝑓 𝑄𝑖𝑅
2 + 𝑐𝑖2
𝑓 𝑄𝑖𝑅 , 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁,                 (10) 
𝐶𝑒(𝐴𝐹) =
1
2
𝑐1
𝑒𝐴𝐹
2 + 𝑐2
𝑒𝐴𝐹 ,                       (11) 
𝐶𝑛(𝐴𝑁) =
1
2
𝑐1
𝑛𝐴𝑁
2 + 𝑐2
𝑛𝐴𝑁.                      (12) 
Based on the above model, we will conduct further analysis of our main concerns in the following 
section. 
3 Analytical results 
In this section, we will analyse under what conditions a policy mix should be employed to achieve 
the carbon emission cap and the share of renewable energy electricity targets, before discussing 
the potential effects of interaction and coordination between the carbon pricing and renewable 
energy power subsidy policies.  
To realise the carbon emission cap and the share of renewable energy electricity targets, the 
policy makers can employ one of three kinds of policy; that is, a single carbon pricing policy, a 
single renewable energy power subsidy policy or a policy mix. The optimal policy would differ for 
the target portfolios for each of these scenarios. To be more specific, the overall portfolio would be 
divided into three subsets. In the first subset, 𝛺𝐶𝑃, it would be key to implement a single carbon 
pricing policy to realise both policy targets. In this subset, once the the carbon pricing policy is 
applied, the competitiveness of the fossil fuel electricity is undermined as a result of the increasing 
carbon cost (or opportunity cost), and the share of the renewable energy electricity target would be 
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achieved simultaneously through the sustitution of fossil fuel electricity with renewable electricity.  
Meanwhile, in the second subset, 𝛺𝑆，it would be optimal to implement a single renewable 
energy power subsidy policy to realise both targets. In this subset, once the renewable energy 
power subsidy policy is implemented, the cost competitiveness of the renewable electricity, 
relative to the fossil-fuel electricity, would be improved as a result of the subsidy. Thereafter, the 
renewable electricity would replace its fossil fuel counterpart, and the CO2 emissions would be 
reduced simultaneously as a result of the reduction of fossil fuel electricity production.   
In the third subset, 𝛺𝐶𝑃&𝑆, a policy mix would be implemented. In this subset, although the 
implementation of the carbon pricing (or renewable energy power subsidy) can promote the 
substitution of the fossil fuel electricity (or carbon emission cap), single carbon pricing (or the 
renewable energy power subsidy) is not enough to achieve the share of the renewable energy 
electricity target (or carbon emission cap target), and a policy mix is therefore necessary. 
To illustrate the above idea more explicitly, we created a graph. As shown in Figure 1, the 
horizontal axis represents the share of the renewable energy electricity target, while the vertical 
axis is the carbon emission cap target. The entire area is divided into three parts by two boundary 
curves: AB and CD. These three areas correspond to the three subsets referred to above. To be 
precise, Area 1 corresponds to the subset 𝛺𝑆, in which both policy targets can be achieved by the 
single renewable energy power subsidy policy, and the CO2 price would be zero; similarly, Area 2 
corresponds to the subset 𝛺𝐶𝑃，in which both targets can be achieved by the single carbon pricing 
policy and the renewable energy power subsidy is zero. Finally, Area 3 corresponds to the subset 
𝛺𝐶𝑃&𝑆，in which area a policy mix should be employed to realise the two policy targets.  
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============================================================= 
Figure 1 The coordination between carbon emission cap and share of renewable electricity targets 
============================================================= 
 
The boundary curve AB can be obtained by letting the CO2 price equal zero, while similarly, the 
boundary curve CD can be obtained by letting the renewable energy power subsidy equal zero. 
To obtain the three subsets of the policy target portfolio, the key point is to find the boundary 
curves, AB and CD. In Proposition 1, we try to drive the function of the two curves. 
Proposition 1. There are boundaries such that, the first subset of the target portfolio, in which the 
carbon emission cap and the share of renewable energy electricity targets can be achieved by 
single carbon pricing policy, is represented as follow, 
𝛺𝐶𝑃 = {(𝛼, ?̅?)| 0 < 𝛼 < 𝛼𝐶𝑃(?̅?)} 
𝛼𝐶𝑃(?̅?) represents the boundary curve CD and 𝛼𝐶𝑃 is the maximum share of renewable energy 
electricity that can be achieved by the carbon pricing policy with the carbon emission cap target 
(?̅?) set by the government. 
The second subset of the target portfolio, in which the carbon emission cap and the share of 
renewable energy electricity targets can be achieved by single renewable energy power subsidy 
policy, is represented as follow,  
𝛺𝑆 = {(𝛼, ?̅?)|?̅? ≥ ?̅?𝑆(𝛼)} 
?̅?𝑆(𝛼) represents the boundary curve AB and ?̅?𝑆 is the minimum carbon emissions that can be 
achieved by the renewable energy power subsidy policy with the share of the renewable energy 
electricity target (𝛼) set by the government. 
The third subset of the target portfolio, in which the policy mix of the carbon pricing and 
renewable energy power subsidy policies should be implemented to realise the two targets, is 
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represented as, 
𝛺𝐶𝑃&𝑆 = {(𝛼, ?̅?)|𝛼𝐶𝑃(?̅?) ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1 ,  0 ≤ ?̅? ≤ ?̅?𝑆(𝛼)}    
Proof: See Appendix A. 
Next, we will analyse the effect of interaction between the coexisting carbon pricing and 
renewable energy power subsidy policies in the subset 𝛺𝐶𝑃&𝑆, an area of concern for many 
researchers (Goulder, 2013; Levinson, 2010).  
Proposition 2. In the subset 𝛺𝐶𝑃&𝑆, tightening the carbon emission cap, together with a fixed 
share of the renewable energy electricity target, will lead to an increase (decrease) in the CO2 price 
(renewable energy power subsidy); on the other hand, a higher share of the renewable energy 
electricity target together with a fixed carbon emission cap may lead to a decrease (increase) in 
CO2 price (renewable energy power subsidy). 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
Remark: Proposition 2 indicates that there is a potential synergistic effect, as well as a conflict 
effect, between the carbon pricing and renewable energy power subsidy policies. More specifically, 
tightening the carbon emission cap will lower the renewable energy power subsidy needed to 
realise the share of the renewable electricity target; this is the synergistic effect. In contrast, 
increasing the share of renewable energy electricity will promote the substitution of fossil fuel 
power with renewable energy power, which in turn exerts downward pressure on the CO2 permit 
demand, thereby driving down the CO2 price and potentially undermining the effectiveness of the 
carbon pricing policy. This is the possible conflict effect, which has been pointed out in much 
relevant research (Amundsen and Mortensen, 2001; De Jonghe, 2009; Jensen and Skytte, 2003; 
Tsao et al., 2011). 
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Due to this effect, the renewable energy subsidy may lead to a collapse of CO2 prices (Clo et al., 
2013; Koch et al., 2014), and it cannot provide an effective incentive for low-carbon technology 
investment (Blanco and Rodrigues, 2008; Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006), which may increase the risk 
of carbon lock-in (Clò et al., 2013). Accordingly, with the share of the renewable energy electricity 
target fixed, the carbon emission cap should be reduced to stablize the CO2 price (Gawel, 2014；
Freitas, 2015; Fais, 2014). Thereafter, we can obtain the relationship between the carbon emission 
cap and the share of the renewable energy electricity target under a certain CO2 price, as stated in 
Proposition 3.  
Proposition 3. In order to keep the CO2 price at a certain level, i.e. P, the carbon emission cap 
should be adjusted with a varying share of the renewable energy electricity target, and this 
relationship is as follow, 
?̅? =
𝜃𝑐1
𝑓(1−𝛼)(a𝐶𝑅1−𝛼𝐶𝑅2)+ 𝜉(𝛼)𝜃𝑐2
𝑓
−𝑃( 𝜉(𝛼)(𝑐1
𝑓
𝑊−𝜃2)+𝑈(𝛼)𝑊)
(𝑐1
𝑓
 𝜉(𝛼)+𝑈(𝛼))
+ 𝑀.         (13) 
In addition, based on Eq. (17), the iso-carbon price curve, i.e. P, can be expressed as: 
𝑃 =
𝑐1
𝑓(1−𝛼)(a𝐶𝑅1−𝛼𝐶𝑅2)+𝜉(𝛼)𝜃𝑐2
𝑓
−(𝑐1
𝑓
 𝜉(𝛼)+𝑈(𝛼))(?̅?−𝑀)
𝜉(𝛼)(𝑐1
𝑓
𝑊−𝜃2)+𝑈(𝛼)𝑊
,             (14) 
where 𝐶𝑅1 = ∑
1
𝑐𝑖2
𝑟
𝑁
𝑖=1 , 𝐶𝑅2 = ∑
𝑐𝑖2
𝑟
𝑐𝑖1
𝑟
𝑁
𝑖=1 , 𝑀 = 𝐸𝑁 +
𝑐2
𝑒
𝑐1
𝑒 +
𝑐2
𝑛
𝑐1
𝑛 −
𝜃𝑐2
𝑓
𝑐1
𝑓 , 𝑊 =
𝜃2
𝑐1
𝑓 +
1
𝑐1
𝑒 +
1
𝑐1
𝑛 , 𝑈(𝛼) =
(𝑐1
𝑓)
2
𝐶𝑅1(1 − 𝛼)
2, 𝜉(𝛼) = 2𝑏𝐶𝑅1 + 𝛼
2. 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
As shown in Figure 1, in Area 3, an iso-carbon price curve can be obtained, e.g. FG, in which 
the CO2 price is equal to P. According to Proposition 3, to keep the CO2 price at a certain level, e.g. 
P, the carbon emission cap should be adjusted from ?̅?1 to ?̅?2 with the share of the renewable 
energy electricity target correspondingly increasing from 𝛼1 to 𝛼2, i.e. from point H to point I.  
4 An empirical study of China’s energy and climate targets for 2020 
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China is the largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world, and therefore has a crucial role to 
play in mitigating global climate change. China set its targets for carbon intensity reduction and 
increasing its share of renewable energy-based electricity as part of the 13
th
 Five-Year Plan 
(2016-2020), and accordingly, its carbon pricing and renewable energy power subsidy policies 
have been implemented. In this section, an empirical study on the interaction and coordination 
between these two policies is conducted, based on the model and propositions referred to above. 
Initially, we will present our estimation of the key parameters of the model in Section 4.1, before 
the empirical results are laid out in Section 4.2.  
4.1 Parameter estimation 
The key parameters of the model for the case of China are estimated, including those of the cost 
function for the fossil fuel and renewable energy power production, the carbon emission 
abatement cost function for fossil fuel power and the non-electricity sector, and the electricity 
demand function.  
4.1.1 Cost function of power generation 
We fit the marginal production cost function of a Chinese fossil fuel power producer with a 
linear-quadratic form function, shown in Eq. (9). As the production cost of fossil fuel-based 
electricity varies significantly between different regions of China, we used the data on fossil fuel 
power generation amounts and the corresponding on-grid prices in various regions to estimate the 
key parameters 𝑐1
𝑓 and 𝑐2
𝑓. The data on the production amounts and costs were taken from the 
Chinese Electric Power Statistics Yearbook (2013) and the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC, 2014a). The results are shown in Table 1.  
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============================================================ 
Table 1 The estimation results of the marginal cost function for fossil fuel electricity production 
=============================================================== 
Similarly, we used the data on renewable energy power generation amounts and the 
corresponding levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) of different technologies to fit the marginal 
cost function of the renewable power production with a linear-quadratic form function, shown in 
Eq. (10). The data on the production amounts came from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 
2015) and NDRC (2014b, 2014c), while those on the LCOE in different technologies were from 
the International Energy Agency (IEA) (2010), Ouyang and Lin (2014) and the China Electric 
Power Statistical Yearbook (2013). The results are shown in Table 2. 
=========================================================== 
Table 2 The estimation results of the marginal cost functions for renewable electricity production 
============================================================= 
4.1.2 The estimation of carbon abatement cost function 
Many existing research use a multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to 
estimate the marginal abatement cost for different sectors. Specifically, after calibrating the model 
in the BAU scenario, the carbon tax was introduced as a shock to model, and in the new 
equilibrium state, the new carbon emission amount for each sector can be obtained, and the carbon 
abatement amount can be obtained accordingly. Following the same way, shocking the model 
using different carbon tax, the corresponding carbon emission abatement data can be obtained. In 
addition, these data can also be obtained by another way. In specific, the model can be shocked 
using different carbon emission cap, and then the implied carbon price or shadow value of the 
carbon constraint and carbon emission amount for each sector can be obtained in the new 
equilibrium. Using these carbon tax (price) and carbon abatement data, the marginal abatement 
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cost function can be fitted and estimated. Bi (2012) obtained the data of carbon tax rate and the 
corresponding carbon emission (abatement) data for different sectors in China using the China 
Dynamic Energy Computable General Equilibrium model. We divided all sectors of the economy 
into two groups – that is, the electricity sector and the non-electricity sector – before fitting the 
carbon abatement cost function of the fossil fuel electricity sector and non-electricity sector with a 
linear-quadratic form function, as shown in Eq. (11) and Eq. (12), respectively. The estimation 
results are shown in Table 3. 
================================================================= 
Table 3 The estimation of marginal abatement cost curve for fossil fuel electricity sector and non-electricity sector 
=================================================================== 
4.1.3 The estimation of electricity demand function 
We estimated the electricity demand function parameters as per the linear function (a andb ) 
shown in Eq. (8), using the consumer electricity price (NEA, 2014a) and the electricity 
consumption data from NBS (2013; 2014). The results are shown in Table 4, and the details of the 
estimation can be found in Appendix B. 
========================================= 
Table 4 The estimation of electricity demand function 
========================================= 
4.2 Empirical results analysis 
In this section, we make an empirical analysis of the policy interaction and coordination in China’s 
case based on the three propositions in analytical results (Section 3). Firstly, we verify the validity 
of the model and parameters by comparing the simulation results and the real data. Thereafter, the 
effect of interaction between the carbon pricing and renewable energy power subsidy policies is 
explored, and the method of coordinating the carbon emission cap and the share of renewable 
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energy electricity targets by 2020 is determined. 
4.2.1 Validity verification of the model  
With China’s carbon emission intensity and the share of renewable energy electricity targets in 
2014 as the input for the model, we were able to calculate the electricity production, electricity 
price, carbon abatement and CO2 price for that year. Then, by comparing the simulation results 
with the real data for 2014, the validity of the model could be verified. China’s CO2 emissions in 
2014 are 9.76Gt (BP statistical review of world energy, 2015) and its share of renewable energy 
power was 3.5%, according to the China Statistical Yearbook (NBS, 2015). Accordingly, the 
policy target portfolio can be expressed as ?̅? = 9.76Gt, 𝛼 = 3.5%, which is included in the 
subset of the policy mix, 𝛺𝐶𝑃&𝑆 = {𝛼 = 3.5%, 6.6𝐺𝑡 ≤ ?̅? ≤ 10.1𝐺𝑡}. The detailed simulation 
results, as well as those for the real data, are shown in Table 5. 
========================================= 
Table 5 Comparison between the simulation results and real data in 2014 
========================================= 
In Table 5, we compare the key simulation results with the real data, such as fossil fuel and 
renewable energy electricity generation, the on-grid prices for fossil fuel and renewable energy 
power, and the CO2 price. In 2014, the fossil fuel and renewable generation were 4233.7 TWh and 
156.3 TWh according to the China Statistical Yearbook (NBS, 2015), and the simulation results 
were 4278 and 155.2TWh, with the relative errors being 1% and 0.7% respectively. The on-grid 
power price for fossil fuel and wind power were 0.46 and 0.61 RMB/KWh, and the simulation 
results were 0.49 and 0.67 RMB/KWh respectively, with the relative errors being 6.5% and 9.8%. 
Finally, the CO2 price in the Chinese carbon trading pilots was 31.2 RMB/t CO2 and 31.6 RMB/t 
CO2 in the simulation result, with the relative error being 1.3%. In summary, the relative errors 
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between the simulation results and the real data are acceptable, and our model and its parameters 
are proven to be valid.  
4.2.2 The interaction between carbon pricing and renewable 
electricity subsidy policies 
According to Proposition 2, there is a potential synergistic effect, as well as a conflict effect, 
between the carbon pricing and renewable energy power subsidy policies. More specifically, the 
decreasing carbon emission cap may lower the renewable energy power subsidy needed to realise 
the renewable electricity share target. In contrast, an increase of the renewable energy power 
electricity target may result in a different generation mixt, reduce the total emission, and lower the 
CO2 prices. In this section, we discuss this interaction effect between the carbon pricing and 
renewable energy power subsidy policies in China based on empirical analysis, as shown in Figure 
2. 
The left pane of the Figure 2 shows the CO2 price with varying shares of the renewable energy 
electricity target in different scenarios of carbon budgeting or levels of the carbon emission cap. 
As expected, as the latter increases, the CO2 price lowers, in line with a given share of the 
renewable energy electricity target. More specifically, when keeping the share of renewable 
energy-based electricity at a certain level in 2014, such as 3.5%, the CO2 price would decrease 
from 40 RMB/t CO2 to 31.6 RMB/t CO2, and further to 23.3 RMB/t CO2, when the carbon 
emission cap increases from 9.6Gt CO2 to 9.7Gt CO2 and to 9.8Gt CO2. What is really of interest 
is that, with a given carbon emission cap, the CO2 price would be lower, with the share of the 
renewable energy-based electricity target becoming more stringent. For example, with the carbon 
emission cap given as the current emission level – that is, 9.7Gt CO2 – the CO2 price decreases 
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from 35RMB/tCO2 to 26RMB/tCO2 with the share of the renewable energy electricity target 
increasing from 2.5% to 4.5%. This is the conflict effect between the carbon pricing and 
renewable energy policies; to keep the CO2 price at the initial level, i.e. 35RMB/tCO2, the carbon 
emission cap should be more stringent, that is between 9.7Gt CO2 and 9.6Gt CO2.  
The right pane of Figure 2 shows how the renewable energy power subsidy changes with the 
carbon emission cap adjustment in different scenarios regarding the share of the renewable energy 
electricity target. Similarly, with a given carbon emission cap, the renewable energy power 
subsidy increases, with the share of the renewable energy power energy electricity target 
becoming stringent. What is more, with the carbon emission cap becoming stringent – in other 
words, a lower carbon emission budget – the renewable energy power subsidy required to realise a 
given share of the renewable energy power energy electricity target would decrease. This is the 
synergy effect between the carbon pricing and renewable energy policies, in which the share of the 
renewable energy electricity target can be realised with a lower renewable energy power subsidy 
when carbon pricing is introduced. To be precise, to realise a share of the renewable energy-based 
electricity target of 4.5%, the renewable energy power subsidy needed decreases from 0.22 
RMB/kWh to 0.21 RMB/kWh. 
=============================================================== 
Figure 2 The interaction effect between carbon pricing and renewable energy power subsidy policies 
================================================================== 
4.2.3 The coordination between the carbon emission cap and share of 
renewable energy electricity targets by 2020 
In the analytical results in Section 3, the three subsets of the policy target portfolio have been 
obtained in proposition 1, and the coordination between the carbon emission cap and the 
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renewable electricity share targets to alleviate the negative/conflict effect between the coexisting 
policies have been proposed in Proposition 3. To make the empirical analysis of Proposition 1 and 
3 in China’s case, we will attempt to identify the policy that should be employed to realise the 
carbon emission cap and the share of renewable energy-based electricity targets by 2020, and how 
to coordinate the two policy targets to mitigate potential policy conflicts in China.  
In any such attempt, the carbon emission cap and the share of renewable energy electricity 
targets in 2020 should first be determined. For the latter, the share of non-hydro renewables should 
reach 9%, according to the National Energy Development Strategy Action Plan (2014-2020) 
(NEA, 2014b). The carbon emission cap for 2020 can be calculated as follows. The economic 
output (nominal GDP) and carbon emissions in 2005 were 18.59 Trillion RMB and 6.3Gt (NBS, 
2006; BP statistical review of world energy, 2015), while the carbon intensity in the same year was 
0.0034 kg CO2/RMB. The Chinese government has promised to reduce carbon emissions’ 
intensity by 40%-45% from 2005 levels by 2020. Based on such a pledge, said intensity in 2020 in 
China would be 0.0018 CO2/RMB. Based on the economic output (GDP from 2005-2015), GDP 
index (2005-2015) (NBS, 2015) and the expected GDP growth rate (2015-2020) (NDRC 2016), 
we can calculate the GDP in 2020 (with 2005 as the base year) as 64.41 Trillion RMB. Thereafter, 
the carbon emission cap for the same year can be obtained by multiplying the GDP by the carbon 
intensity, which is about 12Gt CO2. 
Besides the outlined targets referred to above, some relevant parameters should be updated 
for 2020, including the carbon emission intensity of the fossil fuel-based electricity sector ( ) and 
the emission amount for the non-electricity sector (𝐸𝑁) in the baseline scenario. According to the 
National Energy Development Strategy Action Plan (2014-2020) (NEA, 2014), the standard coal 
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consumption for power generation should be less than 300gce/kWh. The emission factor of 
standard coal is 2.46tCO2/tce (IPCC, 2006). The carbon emission intensity of coal power 
generation in 2020 can be obtained by multiplying the standard coal consumption for power 
generation with the emission factor of standard coal; giving a result of 738g CO2/kWh.  
In addition, non-electricity CO2 emissions were 66Gt in 2014 (NBS, 2015), and their average 
annual growth rate is expected to be 1.6% during the 13
th
 Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), according 
to He (2015). Based on this, the non-electricity CO2 emissions for 2020 can be calculated as 71 
Gt.  
Based on the new parameter settings, the entire set of the policy target portfolio can be 
divided into three subsets, as stated in Proposition 1, which is shown in Figure 3. In Area 2 
( 𝛺𝐶𝑃 = {𝛼 = 9%, 0 ≤ ?̅? ≤ 5.4𝐺𝑡})  the single carbon pricing policy is optimal; in Area 1 
(𝛺𝑆 = {𝛼 = 9%, ?̅? ≥ 10.2𝐺𝑡}), the single renewable energy power subsidy policy is optimal and 
in Area 3 (𝛺𝐶𝑃&𝑆 = {𝛼 = 9%, 5.4𝐺𝑡 ≤ ?̅? ≤ 10.2𝐺𝑡}), the policy mix is necessary. The policy 
target portfolio in 2020 is (𝛼 = 9%, ?̅? = 9.76𝐺𝑡) and is included in Area 1. This means that a 
single renewable energy power subsidy policy is sufficient to achieve the carbon emission 
abatement target and the share of renewable energy-based electricity target. In addition, the CO2 
price will be reduced to zero, and the carbon pricing policy may have little effect on the carbon 
abatement and cannot effectively promote the investment of low-carbon technology. This is the 
policy conflict shown in Proposition 2. To stablize the CO2 price, the carbon emissions cap in 
2020 needs to be adjusted according to Proposition 3. More specifically, to keep the CO2 price at 
the level of the simulation results for 2014, i.e. 31.6 RMB/t CO2, the carbon emission budget 
should be reduced to 9.83Gt, as shown in Fig. 3; and accordingly, the carbon emissions intensity 
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for 2020 should be reduced by 50% compared to that in 2005, based on the simulation results.  
 
============================================================ 
Figure 3 The coordination between the carbon emission cap and share of renewable energy targets in 2020 
============================================================ 
In addition, to promote low-carbon technology investment to good effect, it is necessary to 
increase the CO2 price even further to between 140 RMB/t CO2 and 300 RMB/t CO2 in China, 
according to many relevant studies (McKinsey Company, 2009; Mo and Zhu, 2014), and the 
carbon emission cap should be further adjusted accordingly. Based on the simulation result, the 
carbon emissions cap should be reduced to 8.6Gt and further to 7.1Gt, to bolster the CO2 price 
from the current level to 140 RMB/t CO2 and, further, to 280 RMB/t CO2. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, a partial equilibrium model was built to explore the interaction between the carbon 
pricing policy and the renewable energy power subsidy. Based on this model, the following issues 
were explored: under what conditions a single or policy mix is optimal to realise the given policy 
targets, and how to coordinate different policy target settings to reduce the potential conflict 
between policy instruments, especially in terms of possible CO2 price collapses. The optimal 
portfolio of the two policy targets is obtained and, notably, the means to coordinate the two policy 
targets to stablize the CO2 price is derived.  
The analytical resutls show that the whole set of carbon abatemwnt and renewable energy target 
portfolio can be divided into three subsets, in which the carbon emission cap and the renewable 
electricity share targets can be achieved by the single carbon pricing policy, single renewable 
energy power subsidy policy or policy mix, respectively. In the case of the policy mix, there exists 
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policy interaction effect between carbon pricing and renewable energy power subsidy. In specific, 
there is a potential synergistic effect, as well as a conflict effect, between the carbon pricing and 
renewable energy power subsidy policies. More specifically, tightening the carbon emission cap 
will lower the renewable energy power subsidy needed to realise the share of the renewable 
electricity target; this is the synergistic effect. In contrast, increasing the share of renewable 
energy electricity will promote the substitution of fossil fuel power with renewable energy power, 
which in turn exerts downward pressure on the CO2 permit demand, thereby driving down the CO2 
price and potentially undermining the effectiveness of the carbon pricing policy. This is the 
possible conflict effect. In order to alleviating the policy conflict effect, the adjustment path of 
carbon emission cap target with a varying share of the renewable energy electricity target, to 
maintain the CO2 price at a certain level was proposeed. 
Corresponding with propositions in analytical results, an empirical study of China’s case was 
conducted. The empirical results show that the single renewable energy power subsidy policy can 
serve to achieve the carbon emission reduction and share of renewable energy electricity targets in 
2020 by itself, but the CO2 price may drop to zero, with the carbon pricing policy having little 
effect on the carbon abatement and the low-carbon technology investment. That is the conflict 
effect between the coexisting policies. Therefore, to address the potential effect of policy conflict 
between the carbon pricing and renewable energy power subsidy policy, it may be necessary to 
adjust the carbon emission cap. More specific, the carbon emission cap should be decreased to 
9.8Gt to stablize the CO2 price at the current level in the pilot ETSs; i.e., 31.6 RMB/t. In such case, 
the carbon emissions intensity in 2020 should be reduced by 50% relative to that in 2005.  
There are some limitations worth noting in this work. In the equilibrium model employed, a 
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completely competitive electricity market is assumed, and the market regulation by the 
government is ignored. In fact, the market intervention may lead to a distortionary price, and the 
simplification of the model may overestimate the pass through of the carbon price in our model. In 
addition, the transaction costs are not considered in current model, which may affect the ultimate 
equilibrium results of the model and the coordination between carbon pricing and renewable 
energy power subsidy policy. It should also be pointed out that the empirical results of the China 
case study were obtained based on certain relevant assumptions, such as cost parameters, which 
may affect the optimal policy choice. To be specific, the lower abatement cost in the power sector 
can improve the competitiveness of the fossil fuel sector and increase the power generation from 
fossil fuel, and to increase the share of renewables generation, a single renewable energy power 
subsidy policy may not ensure the achievement of both policy targets. In addition, with the cost of 
renewable generation decreasing due to the learning effect, the single subsidy policy may have a 
more significant effect on renewable development and may be sufficient to achieve both policy 
targets. However, the subsidy level for renewable energy in China may become lower in future, 
given that the deficit of the renewable development fund is becoming a grave concern; and in this 
case, the single subsidy policy may not be sufficient to achieve both policy targets. Finally, if the 
carbon abatement target becomes more stringent in future, carbon pricing may also be necessary in 
addition to the subsidy policy. Therefore, the development of renewable energy technology and a 
policy adjustment may affect the empirical results of our study, which should be further explored 
in future. 
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Fig. 1 The coordination between carbon emission cap and share of renewable electricity 
targets 
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Fig. 2 The interaction effect between carbon pricing and renewable energy power subsidy 
policies 
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Fig. 3 The coordination between the carbon emission cap and share of renewable energy 
targets in 2020 
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Table 1 The estimation results of the marginal cost function for fossil fuel electricity production  
**P<0.1, Significant coefficient. 
  
Description Parameter Value Units 
Slope of the marginal cost curve 
1
fc  4.56*10-14** （RMB/KWh2） 
Intercept of the marginal cost curve 
2
fc  0.26** （RMB/KWh） 
Goodness of fit 
R2 adjusted 87.70 (%) 
R2 predicted 85.96 (%) 
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Table 2 The estimation results of the marginal cost functions for renewable electricity production 
Description Parameter Value  Units 
Slope of the 
marginal cost curve 
Wind 
11
rc  9*10-13*** (RMB/KWh2) 
Biomass 
21
rc  1*10-10*** (RMB/KWh2） 
Solar 
31
rc  2*10-11*** (RMB/KWh2) 
Intercept of the 
marginal cost curve 
Wind 
12
rc  0.53*** (RMB/KWh) 
Biomass 
22
rc  0.62*** (RMB/KWh) 
Solar 
32
rc  0.82*** (RMB/KWh) 
Goodness of fit 
Wind 
R2 adjusted 91.70 (%) 
R2 predicted 90.72 (%) 
Biomass 
R2 adjusted 91.76 (%) 
R2 predicted 89.17 (%) 
Solar 
R2 adjusted 92.32 (%) 
R2 predicted 91.38 (%) 
***P<0.05, Significant coefficient. 
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Table 3 The estimation of marginal abatement cost curve for fossil fuel electricity sector and non-electricity sector  
Description Parameter Value  Units 
Slope of the 
marginal cost curve 
fossil fuel electricity sector 
1
ec  4*10-7*** (RMB/t2 CO2) 
non-electricity sector 
1
nc  3.5*10-7*** (RMB/t2 CO2) 
Intercept of the 
marginal cost curve 
fossil fuel electricity sector 
2
ec  0 (RMB/t CO2) 
non-electricity sector 
2
nc  0 (RMB/t CO2) 
Goodness of fit 
fossil fuel electricity sector 
R2 adjusted 85.30 (%) 
R2 predicted 83.15 (%) 
non-electricity sector 
R2 adjusted 86.39 (%) 
R2 predicted 84.54 (%) 
***P<0.05, Significant coefficient. 
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Table 4 The estimation of electricity demand function 
Description Units Parameter Value 
Power price demand elasticity - 
dE  -5.54 
Intercept of demand function （RMB/KWh） a  0.70 
Slope of demand function  （RMB/KWh2） b  2*10-14 
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Table 5 Comparison between the simulation results and real data in 2014 
 Total 
electricity 
production 
Fossil fuel 
electricity 
production 
Renewable 
electricity 
production 
 On-grid price 
of fossil-fuel 
electricity 
On-grid price of 
renewable 
electricity  
CO2 price 
 (TWh) (TWh) (TWh) （RMB/kWh） （RMB/kWh） （RMB/tCO2） 
Simulation results 4433.2 4278.0 155.2 0.49 0.67 31.6 
Data in reality 4453.4 a 4233.7 a 156.3 a 0.46 b 0.61b 31.2 c 
Relative Error (%) 0.5 1 0.7 6.5 9.8 1.3 
Notes: a Data sources: NBS (2015); 
b Data source: NDRC (2014a; 2014b); 
c Data sources: Liu et al. (2015). 
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Appendix A 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
To obtain the three areas referred to in Proposition 1 of Section 3, the critical issue is to find 
the two boundary curves that separate the entire set of the policy target portfolio into the three 
subsets. 
A.1 Single carbon pricing policy model: 
In the market equilibrium state, all the participants optimise their decision to maximise their 
profits, and first-order conditions can be obtained. Concretely, the fossil fuel electricity 
producer maximises its profit 𝜋𝐹(∙)  by optimising its electricity production and carbon 
abatement (𝑄𝐹 , 𝐴𝐹) simultaneously, which yields the following first-order conditions: 
𝐶𝑓
′(𝑄𝐹) = 𝑃𝑓 − 𝜃𝑃𝑐,                           (A.1) 
𝐶𝑒
′(𝐴𝐹) = 𝑃𝑐.                            (A.2) 
Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2) show that the on-grid power price is equal to the sum of the marginal 
production costs of fossil fuel power and the carbon emission cost, and the CO2 price is 
determined by the marginal cost of the carbon emission abatement.  
For the renewable energy electricity producer, the on-grid price is equal to the marginal cost 
of the renewable energy electricity production: 
𝐶𝑟
′(𝑄𝑖𝑅) = 𝑃𝑟 .                             (A.3) 
Similarly, for the power grid firm, the first-order condition is as follows:  
𝑃(𝑄𝑇) + 𝑃
′(𝑄𝑇) ∙ 𝑄𝑇 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑃𝑓 + 𝛼𝑃𝑟,                  (A.4) 
which depicts the relationship between the electricity sales price, i.e. consumer price, and the 
on-grid prices of fossil fuel power and renewable energy power. 
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With the assumption of a single carbon pricing policy, the on-grid price of renewable 
energy-based electricity is equal to the on-grid price of fossil fuel, and the subsidy is zero, which 
can be expressed as:   
𝑆 = 𝑃𝑟 − 𝑃𝑓 = 0,                           (A.5) 
Additionally, the share of renewable energy-derived electricity is as follows:  
𝛼 =
∑ 𝑄𝑖𝑅
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑄𝐹+∑ 𝑄𝑖𝑅
𝑁
𝑖=1
.                             (A.6) 
There is also a carbon emission cap target set by the government, which constitutes the main 
constrained conditions and is expressed as follows:   
𝜃𝑄𝐹 − 𝐴𝐹 + 𝐸𝑁 − 𝐴𝑁 = ?̅?,                       (A.7) 
Then, we substitute the cost function and demand function, i.e. Eqs. (8)-(12) in Section 2 into 
these equations above, allowing us to obtain the share of the renewable electricity (𝛼𝐶𝑃) as a 
function of the carbon emission cap (?̅?): 
𝛼𝐶𝑃(?̅?) =
−𝜖(?̅?)+√𝜖2(?̅?)−4𝛾(?̅?)𝜗(?̅?)
2𝛾(?̅?)
,                   (A.8) 
in which 𝐶𝑅1 = ∑
1
𝑐𝑖2
𝑟
𝑁
𝑖=1 , 𝐶𝑅2 = ∑
𝑐𝑖2
𝑟
𝑐𝑖1
𝑟
𝑁
𝑖=1 , 𝛾(?̅?) = ?̅? − 𝐸𝑁 − 𝜃𝐶𝑅2 + 𝑐1
𝑓
𝐶𝑅1(?̅? − 𝐸𝑁) + 𝜃𝑐2
𝑓
𝐶𝑅1, 
𝜖(?̅?) = (𝜃𝑎𝐶𝑅1 + 𝜃𝐶𝑅2 − 𝑐2
𝑓
𝐶𝑅1 − 𝑐1
𝑓
𝐶𝑅1(?̅? − 𝐸𝑁)), 𝜗(?̅?) = (𝑐1
𝑓
𝐶𝑅1(?̅? − 𝐸𝑁) + 𝜃𝑐2
𝑓
𝐶𝑅1 +
2𝑏𝐶𝑅1(?̅? − 𝐸𝑁) − 𝜃𝑎𝐶𝑅1). 
𝛼𝐶𝑃(?̅?) represents the boundary curve, which is the maximum share of renewable energy-based 
electricity achieved by the carbon pricing policy with the carbon emission cap target (?̅?). Then, 
the subset of the target portfolio that can be achieved by the single carbon pricing policy is 
expressed as follows:  
𝛺𝐶𝑃 = {(𝛼, ?̅?)| 0 < 𝛼 < 𝛼𝐶𝑃(?̅?)} 
A.2 Single renewable energy power subsidy policy model: 
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With the assumption of the single renewable energy power subsidy policy, the equilibrium 
carbon price is zero: 
 𝑃𝑐 = 0.                                (A.9) 
Similarly, the representative fossil fuel electricity producer and renewable energy electricity 
producer maximise their profits by optimising their electricity production (𝑄𝐹, 𝑄𝑖𝑅) simultaneously, 
which yields the following first-order conditions: 
𝐶𝑓
′(𝑄𝐹) = 𝑃𝑓,                              (A.10) 
𝐶𝑟
′(𝑄𝑖𝑅) = 𝑃𝑟.                              (A.11) 
While for the power grid firm, the first-order condition is as follows:  
𝑃(𝑄𝑇) + 𝑃
′(𝑄𝑇) ∙ 𝑄𝑇 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑃𝑓 + 𝛼𝑃𝑟                (A.12) 
There is a policy target set by the government that constitutes the main constraint conditions. 
More specifically, the share of renewable energy electricity’s constraint is expressed as follows: 
 𝑄𝑅 = 𝛼(𝑄𝐹 + ∑ 𝑄𝑖𝑅
𝑁
𝑖=1 ).                       (A.13) 
With the assumption of a single renewable energy power subsidy policy, the on-grid price of 
renewable energy-based electricity is greater than the on-grid price of fossil fuel, which can be 
expressed as:   
𝑆 = 𝑃𝑟 − 𝑃𝑓 ≥ 0.                          (A.14) 
While the carbon emission is as follows:  
?̅? = 𝜃𝑄𝐹 + 𝐸𝑁.                          (A.15) 
Similarly, we substitute the cost function and demand function, i.e. Eqs. (8)-(12), in Section 2.2 
into these equations above, and can thereby obtain the carbon emission cap (?̅?𝑆) as a function of 
the share of the renewable electricity (𝛼):  
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?̅?𝑆(𝛼) =
𝐿(
𝛼
𝑐1
𝑓−(1−𝛼)𝐶𝑅1)(𝑎+2𝑏(
𝑐2
𝑓
𝑐1
𝑓+𝐶𝑅2))−(2𝑏
𝜃2
(𝑐1
𝑓
)2
−𝐿(1+2𝑏(
1
𝑐1
𝑓+𝐶𝑅1)))((1−𝛼)
𝑐2
𝑓
𝑐1
𝑓−𝛼𝐶𝑅2)
𝐽
  (A.16) 
in which 𝐶𝑅1 = ∑
1
𝑐𝑖2
𝑟
𝑁
𝑖=1 , 𝐶𝑅2 = ∑
𝑐𝑖2
𝑟
𝑐𝑖1
𝑟
𝑁
𝑖=1 , 𝐽 = 2𝑏
𝜃
𝑐1
𝑓 (
𝛼
𝑐1
𝑓 − (1 − 𝛼)𝐶𝑅1), 𝐿 =
𝜃2
𝑐1
𝑓 +
1
𝑐1
𝑒 +
1
𝑐1
𝑛. 
?̅?𝑆(𝛼) represents the boundary curve, which is the minimum carbon emission cap achieved by the 
renewable energy power subsidy policy with the share of the renewable energy electricity target 
(𝛼). Then, the subset of the target portfolio, which can be achieved by a single renewable energy 
power subsidy policy, is represented as follows: 
ΩS = {(α, E̅)| 0 ≤α ≤ 1, E̅ ≥ E̅S(α)}; 
Finally, the middle area between 𝛺𝐶𝑃 and 𝛺𝑆 is the subset of the target portfolio, which should 
be achieved by a policy mix:  
Ω
CP&S
= {(α, E̅)|α
CP
(E̅) ≤α ≤ 1,  0 ≤ E̅ ≤ E̅S(α)} 
In the subset 𝛺𝐶𝑃&𝑆, although the implementation of the carbon pricing (renewable energy power 
subsidy) can promote the substitution of the fossil fuel electricity (carbon emission abatement), 
single carbon pricing (renewable energy power subsidy) is not enough to achieve the share of the 
renewable energy-based electricity target (carbon abatement target), and the policy mix is 
necessary. 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
First, we can obtain CO2 price 𝑃𝑐 and the renewable energy power subsidy as a function of 
the carbon emission cap and the share of renewable energy electricity targets in Section 2, based 
on the first-order conditions Eqs. (A.1)-(A.4), the constraint conditions Eqs. (5)-(8) and the cost 
functions Eqs. (9)-(12), as shown by Eq. (A.17) and Eq. (A.18). 
𝑃𝑐 =
𝑐1
𝑓
(1−𝛼)(𝑎𝐶𝑅1−𝛼𝐶𝑅2)+(2𝑏𝐶𝑅1+𝛼
2)𝜃𝑐2
𝑓
−(𝑐1
𝑓
(2𝑏𝐶𝑅1+𝛼
2)+𝐶𝑅1(𝑐1
𝑓
)
2
(1−𝛼)2)(?̅?−𝑀)
(2𝑏𝐶𝑅1+𝛼
2)(𝑐1
𝑓
(
𝜃2
𝑐1
𝑓+
1
𝑐1
𝑒+
1
𝑐1
𝑛)−𝜃2)+𝐶𝑅1(𝑐1
𝑓
)
2
(1−𝛼)2(
𝜃2
𝑐1
𝑓+
1
𝑐1
𝑒+
1
𝑐1
𝑛)
       (A.17) 
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𝑆 =
(𝛼
1
𝑐1
𝑓(
𝜃2
𝑐1
𝑓+
1
𝑐1
𝑒+
1
𝑐1
𝑛)−𝛼(
𝜃
𝑐1
𝑓)
2
−𝐶𝑅1(1−𝛼)(
𝜃2
𝑐1
𝑓+
1
𝑐1
𝑒+
1
𝑐1
𝑛))𝑃𝑐+(𝛼
1
𝑐1
𝑓−(1−𝛼)𝐶𝑅1)(?̅?−𝑀)−𝛼
𝜃
𝑐1
𝑓
𝑐2
𝑓
𝑐1
𝑓+(1−𝛼)
𝜃
𝑐1
𝑓𝐶𝑅2
(1−𝛼)
𝜃
𝑐1
𝑓𝐶𝑅1
       (A.18) 
where 𝐶𝑅1 = ∑
1
𝑐𝑖2
𝑟
𝑁
𝑖=1 , 𝐶𝑅2 = ∑
𝑐𝑖2
𝑟
𝑐𝑖1
𝑟
𝑁
𝑖=1 , 𝑀 = 𝐸𝑁 +
𝑐2
𝑒
𝑐1
𝑒 +
𝑐2
𝑛
𝑐1
𝑛 −
𝜃𝑐2
𝑓
𝑐1
𝑓 . 
Next, we analyse the effect of interaction between the coexisting carbon pricing and 
renewable energy power subsidy policies. We can differentiate the CO2 price shown in Eq. (A.17) 
with respect to the share of renewable energy-based electricity (𝛼). We can determine that 
𝜕𝑃𝑐
𝜕𝛼
< 0 and a higher share of a renewable energy-derived electricity target will lead to a lower 
CO2 price. 
In addition, we can differentiate the CO2 price shown in Eq. (A.17) with respect to the carbon 
emission cap (?̅?), to obtain: 
𝜕𝑃𝑐
𝜕?̅?
= −
𝑐1
𝑓
(2𝑏𝐶𝑅1+𝛼
2)
(2𝑏𝐶𝑅1+𝛼2)(𝑐1
𝑓
(
𝜃2
𝑐1
𝑓+
1
𝑐1
𝑒+
1
𝑐1
𝑛)−𝜃
2)+𝐶𝑅1(𝑐1
𝑓
)
2
(1−𝛼)2(
𝜃2
𝑐1
𝑓+
1
𝑐1
𝑒+
1
𝑐1
𝑛)
< 0         (A.19) 
Therefore, tightening the carbon emission cap will lead to a higher CO2 price. 
   Next, we can differentiate the renewable energy power subsidy shown in Eq. (A.18) with 
respect to the carbon emission cap ?̅?, to obtain: 
𝜕𝑆
𝜕?̅?
=
𝛼(
1
𝑐1
𝑒+
1
𝑐1
𝑛)−𝐶𝑅1𝑐1
𝑓(1−𝛼)(
𝜃2
𝑐1
𝑓+
1
𝑐1
𝑒+
1
𝑐1
𝑛)
𝜃𝐶𝑅1(1−𝛼)
∙
𝜕𝑃𝑐
𝜕?̅?
+
𝛼−𝐶𝑅1𝑐1
𝑓(1−𝛼)
𝜃𝐶𝑅1(1−𝛼)
  
= 𝑐1
𝑓
𝜃(2𝑏𝐶𝑅1 + 𝛼
2) + 𝛼𝜃𝑐1
𝑓(1 − 𝛼) > 0                  (A.20) 
Accordingly, we can obtain 
𝜕𝑆
𝜕?̅?
> 0, and tightening the carbon emission cap will lead to a lower 
renewable energy power subsidy. 
In addition, we can differentiate the renewable energy power subsidy shown in Eq. (A.18) 
with respect to the share of renewable energy electricity (𝛼), to obtain 
𝜕𝑆
𝜕𝛼
> 0, and a higher share 
of a renewable energy electricity target will lead to a higher subsidy. 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
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Based on Eq. (A.17), we can obtain the relationship between the CO2 emission cap target and the 
share of the renewable energy-based electricity target with a certain CO2 price. That is:  
    ?̅? =
𝜃𝑐1
𝑓(1−𝛼)(a𝐶𝑅1−𝛼𝐶𝑅2)+ 𝜉(𝛼)𝜃𝑐2
𝑓
−𝑃( 𝜉(𝛼)(𝑐1
𝑓
𝑊−𝜃2)+𝑈(𝛼)𝑊)
(𝑐1
𝑓
 𝜉(𝛼)+𝑈(𝛼))
+ 𝑀.      (A.21) 
while the iso-carbon price curve can be obtained as follows: 
    𝑃 =
𝑐1
𝑓(1−𝛼)(a𝐶𝑅1−𝛼𝐶𝑅2)+𝜉(𝛼)𝜃𝑐2
𝑓
−(𝑐1
𝑓
 𝜉(𝛼)+𝑈(𝛼))(?̅?−𝑀)
𝜉(𝛼)(𝑐1
𝑓
𝑊−𝜃2)+𝑈(𝛼)𝑊
,            (A.22) 
where 𝐶𝑅1 = ∑
1
𝑐𝑖2
𝑟
𝑁
𝑖=1 , 𝐶𝑅2 = ∑
𝑐𝑖2
𝑟
𝑐𝑖1
𝑟
𝑁
𝑖=1 , 𝑀 = 𝐸𝑁 +
𝑐2
𝑒
𝑐1
𝑒 +
𝑐2
𝑛
𝑐1
𝑛 −
𝜃𝑐2
𝑓
𝑐1
𝑓 , 𝑊 =
𝜃2
𝑐1
𝑓 +
1
𝑐1
𝑒 +
1
𝑐1
𝑛 , 𝑈(𝛼) =
(𝑐1
𝑓
)
2
𝐶𝑅1(1 − 𝛼)
2, 𝜉(𝛼) = 2𝑏𝐶𝑅1 + 𝛼
2. 
Appendix B 
The electricity demand function is assumed as follows, 
   𝑄 = 𝑓(𝑝)                             (B.1) 
And then, using the consumer electricity price and the electricity consumption data for 2013 and 
2014, the electricity generation in 2014 with Taylor series expansions shown as, 
𝑄2014 = 𝑄2013 − |𝐸𝑑| ∙
𝑄2013
𝑃2013
∙ (𝑃2014 − 𝑃2013)          (B.2) 
And then, the power price demand elasticity, 𝐸𝑑  can be calculated.  
In this paper, we assume the power price demand elasticity will not change from 2014. So, based 
on this power price demand elasticity, 𝐸𝑑, the electricity demand function as base year 2014 can 
be expressed, 
𝑄 = 𝑄2014 − |𝐸𝑑| ∙
𝑄2013
𝑃2013
∙ (𝑃 − 𝑃2013)                (B.3) 
Therefore, the parameters a and b of electricity demand function shown in Eq. (8) can be 
estimated as, 
𝑎 =
(|𝐸𝑑|−1)
|𝐸𝑑|
∙ 𝑃2014, 𝑏 =
𝑃2014
|𝐸𝑑|∙𝑄2014
                  (B.4) 
 
